Abstract. Albrecht et al. [1] at Crypto 2016 and Cheon et al. [4] at ANTS 2016 independently presented a subfield attack on overstretched NTRU problem. Their idea is to map the public key down to the subfield (by norm and trace map respectively) and hence obtain a lattice of smaller dimension for which a lattice reduction algorithm is efficiently applicable. At Eurocrypt 2017, Kirchner and Fouque proposed another variant attack which exploits the presence of orthogonal bases within the cyclotomic number rings and instead of using the matrix of the public key in the subfield, they use the multiplication matrix by the public key in the full field and apply a lattice reduction algorithm to a suitable projected lattice of smaller dimension. They also showed a tight estimation of the parameters broken by lattice reduction and implementation results that their attack is better than the subfield attack.
Introduction
The NTRU encryption scheme is one of the first cryptosystems based on lattices proposed in 1998 by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman [11] . Up to present, NTRUEncrypt remains secure and is considered as one of the fastest post-quantum public key encryption schemes. The NTRU assumption is that, given the quotient ring R = Z[x]/(φ(x)) where φ(x) is a polynomial of degree n and q a positive integer, finding a "short" element in Λ q h = {(x, y) ∈ R 2 | hx = y mod q} is hard. Here h is the public polynomial in R q = Z q [x]/(φ(x)) which is of the form h = gf −1 mod q, where f and g are sampled from R such that they have small coefficient norms and f is invertible modulo q. In the original proposal [11] , the authors used R to be the convolution ring Z[x]/(x n − 1) and the coefficients of f and g are normally taken from the set {−1, 0, 1}. Even though there is no efficient attack against NTRUEncrypt, there is no security reduction to a hard mathematical problem; see [10] for current updates on the security of classical NTRUEncrypt. It is later recommended by Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [14] to replace the polynomial x n − 1 by the cyclotomic polynomial x n + 1 with n a power of 2, based on which they constructed a hash function proven collisionresistant under the assumed hardness of worse-case lattice problem over ideal lattices. Stehlé and Steinfeld used the polynomial x n + 1 and defined a variant of NTRUEncrypt. They showed that if f and g are sampled from a Gaussian distribution with wide enough standard deviation, then NTRUEncrypt is proven to be secure under the hardness of lattice problems in ideal lattices; see [15] for more details. In this paper, we consider only the cyclotomic number ring R = Z[x]/(x n + 1) where n is a power of 2.
Coppersmith and Shamir [6] showed that in order to break an NTRU cryptosystem, it suffices to find a short multiple of the secret key (f, g). The goal of the attack against NTRU problem then is to find a short enough vector in Λ q h , which is corresponding to an integral lattice of dimension 2n; such a short vector will be a short multiple of the secret key (f, g) (see Theorem 8).
Albrecht et al. [1] and Cheon et al. [4] independently at Crypto 2016 and ANTS 2016 proposed a subfield attack on NTRU. Their idea, attributed to Gentry, Szydlo, Jonsson, Nguyen and Stern [9] , is to exploit the presence of a subfield L in the cyclotomic number field K = Q[x]/(x n + 1). They then map the public key h down to the subfield L using the relative norm and trace map respectively. The obtained element h in the subfield L gives rise to the NTRU problem with the associated lattice Λ q h of dimension much smaller than Λ q h . A solution for this NTRU problem in L will later be lift to a solution for the NTRU problem in the full field K, and hence solves NTRU problem with large (overstretched) modulus q. At Eurocrypt 2017, Kirchner and Fouque [12] proposed a variant of the attack and claim that their attack is more efficient than that of Albrecht et al.'s and Cheon et al.'s. Their idea is to exploit the presence of orthogonal basis within the cyclotomic number ring and hence instead of mapping the public key down to the subfield, they use the projected lattices to the subring corresponding to the subfield. Their implementation results show that their attack is applicable with smaller modulus q compared to the subfield attack by Albrecht et al. The aforementioned attacks [1, 4, 12] against overstretched NTRU problem then can break several instances of NTRU-based cryptosystems, such as multilinear maps GGH13 [8] , and fully homomorphic encryption LTV [13] and YASHE [3] .
Our contribution. In this paper, we use tighter bound for norms of elements in the corresponding subfield from Kirchner and Fouque [12] and use the Hermite factor for approximating the output of a lattice reduction algorithm (e.g., LLL) to analyze the subfield attack by Albrecht et al. [1] . As a result, we derive better choice for the subfield for which the attack is applicable with smaller modulus q. Our implementation results support our theoretical estimation for the choice of the subfield (see Table 1 ):
-For the same n = 2 11 , with the choice of subfield L such that |K : L| = 4 while Albrecht et al. (cf. Table 5 in [1] ) chose L such that |K : L| = 8, we can break the NTRU problem with log(q) = 72 while Albrecht et al. succeeded with log(q) = 95; it is a tradeoff that we have to work on a higher dimension lattice. Our succeeded modulus log(q) = 72 for n = 2 11 is close to log(q) = 70 of Kirchner and Fouque which is the smallest succeeded modulus and both have the same choice for the subfield to attack. 
Preliminaries
Let n be a 2-power number and m = 2n. Let K = Q[x]/(x n +1) be the cyclotomic number field. Let L be the subfield of K of degree n with n = rn . Let G be the Galois group of K over Q and H the subgroup of G fixing L.
and denote L : L → K be the canonical inclusion.
The number field K (or L) is viewed as a Euclidean Q-vector space by endowing with the inner product
where e ranges over all the n (or n ) embeddings e : K → C andē its complex conjugate. This defines a Euclidean norm denoted by . . Define the operator norm |.| as
It is easy to check that |a| is equal to max e |e(a)|, the maximal absolute complex embedding of a, and that L(a) 2 = r a 2 , |L(a)| = |a|. Moreover for any a ∈ K, one has |a| ≤ a ≤ √ n · |a|, and using the inequality of arithmetic and geometric means yields
The discriminant of the number field K is denoted by ∆ K . One has that
Proof. Since the rank of M is 1, one can build a K-linear isometry from
where the last inequality follows from (1).
It follows from Lemma 3 (by taking t = √ 2π) that x ≤ s √ n with high probability.
Definition 4 (NTRU Problem). Given a ring R = Z[x]/(x n + 1) as above, a modulus q, a distribution D on R, and a target norm B. The NTRU problem is defined as the following: given h = [gf −1 ] q where f, g are sampled from D (with the condition that f is invertible modulo q), find a vector (x, y) ∈ R 2 such that (x, y) = (0, 0) mod q and of Euclidean norm less than B in the lattice
One can express a basis B for Λ q h as follows
where I n is the identity matrix of degree n and h stands for an n × n matrix whose i-th column is the coefficient vector of the polynomial x i−1 · h mod x n + 1.
Remark 5. Coppersmith and Shamir [6] showed that recovering short enough vectors may be sufficient; the NTRU Problem is essentially to recover the secret key (f, g). Hence, in order to attack the NTRU problem, we need to find a short non-zero vector (x, y) of Λ q h . We follow Albrecht et al. [1] to require that the solution (x, y) to have norm at most q 3/4 .
Heuristic 6 (Lattice reduction algorithms).
There is an algorithm which, given as input a basis of Remark 7. Heuristic 6 holds for random lattices (cf. [7] ). For NTRU lattices (2), if the modulus q is large, then the NTRU lattices (2) contain vectors shorter than (0, . . . , 0, q, 0, . . . , 0), and hence a lattice reduction algorithm (e.g. LLL) can recover a multiple of the secret key. Experiments in Table 2 and  Table 3 show that the root Hermite factor c for which our attack succeeds is much smaller than the approximation in Heuristic 6.
3 Overview of the subfield lattice attack
/(x n + 1) a subfield of K with n = rn . Let D O K ,s be the discrete Gaussian distribution over O K with standard deviation s, and let q be an integer. We consider the NTRU problem with f, g withdrawn from D O K ,s such that f is invertible modulo q. Set h = gf −1 mod q and consider the NTRU lattice
The subfield attack by Albrecht et al. [1] works in three steps as the following.
-Step 1: Norming down the public vector h to an element h in the subfield L -Step 2: Using a lattice reduction algorithm of the lattice Λ q h in the subfield L which has dimension smaller than the original lattice. -Step 3: Lifting up the results from Step 2 to the full field K and prove that they are short vectors in the lattice Λ q h , which are short multiples of secret key (f, g).
Norming down to the subfield
) is a vector of the following lattice
L | h x = y mod q and depending on the parameters, it may be an unusually short one. We now have reduced our NTRU problem in the full field K (for the lattice Λ 
Lattice reduction in the subfield
We now apply a lattice reduction algorithm (cf. Theorem 6) to the lattice Λ q h
we obtain a non-zero vector (x , y ) ∈ Λ q h of norm
where δ L = c 2n is the Hermite factor of the lattice Λ q h , and c is a constant depending on the corresponding lattice algorithm (cf. Theorem 6).
The following shows that if the vector (x , y ) is short enough then it must be an O L -multiple of (f , g ).
Theorem 8 ([12, Theorem 8])
. Let f , g ∈ O L be such that f and g are coprime ideals and that h f = g mod qO L for some h ∈ O L . If (x , y ) ∈ Λ q h has length satisfying
Hence the module M generated by B contains qO
We deduce that λ 1 (Λ * ) = u ≥ n q/ (f , g ) . The hypothesis implies that (x , y ) < λ 1 (Λ * ). Hence (x , y ) ∈ Λ as desired.
Remark 9.
It is proven in [1, Section 2.2] that with high probability (approximately 75%), f and g are coprime. However, the experiments succeeded even when they are not coprime.
Lifting up the short vector
Assume that we have found a short non-zero vector (x , y ) ∈ O 2 L in the lattice Λ q h subject to the condition of Theorem 8, i.e., (x , y ) is a short multiple of (f , g ). We now lift up (x , y ) to (x, y) ∈ O 2 K by computing
where
Revisiting Albrecht et al.'s attack [1]
In this section, we analyse the subfield attack proposed by Albrecht et al. [1] . First, we analyse in Section 4.1 theoretically the modulus q and yield better choice of r for which the subfield attack is feasible with smaller modulus q. In Section 4.2, we compare the theoretical estimation and implementation results.
Theoretical analysis
Set D = s √ n to be the upper bound for the norm of a secret polynomial sampling from the discrete Gaussian distribution
Let L be the subfield of K of degree n , i.e., n = rn , and let Applying a lattice reduction algorithm to the lattice Λ q h , we obtain a non-zero vector (x , y ) of norm (x , y ) ≤ c 2n √ q, and therefore
It follows from Lemma 1 that if
then (x , y ) will be a multiple of (f , g ). Inequality (4) is equivalent to 4n log(c) + 2r log(s) + r log(n) + 1 − log(n ) < log(q).
Notice that 4n log(c) + 2r log(s) + r log(n) = 4n log(c) r + r(2 log(s) + log(n)) ≥ 2 4n log(c)(2 log(s) + log(n)) with equality if and only if r = 4n log(c) 2 log(s) + log(n) .
Hence the choice of r in (6) optimizes the left-hand side of (5), and hence yields the estimation of the modulus q that makes NTRU problem vulnerable to the subfield attack.
Implementation results
In Table 1 , we show our choice of r, which is the index of the subfield L in K, to which we apply the subfield attack, and compare the actual succeeded values of log(q) by our, Albrecht et al.'s [1] and Kirchner-Fouque's experiments. As in previous works of Albrecht et al. and Kirchner-Fouque, we use LLL algorithm in our experiments. We take s = 2/3, and use constant c = 1.0219 (see Heuristic 6) for estimating the choice of r. Experimental results for the cases n = 2
11
and n = 2 12 can be seen from Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. The requirement for success of the attack is that the obtained solution (x, y) is a multiple of (f, g) and has norm at most q 3/4 (following Albrecht et al. [1] ).
-For n = 2 11 , we choose r = 2 2 which is the same as Kirchner-Fouque and different from Albrecht et al. (vs. r = 2
3 ). We succeeded with log(q) = 72, which is much smaller than log(q) = 90 by Albrecht et al. and close to log(q) = 70 by Kirchner-Fouque.
12 , we choose r = 2 3 whereas Albrecht et al. and Kirchner-Fouque's chose r = 2 4 . We succeeded with log(q) = 120 which is smaller than log(q) = 190 by Albrecht et al. and log(q) = 144 by Kirchner-Fouque.
The last column of Table 1 gives our estimated values of breakable log(q) in the subfield attack which are larger than the results from experiments. One reason is that our estimation for the upper bound of the norms of N K/L (f ) and N K/L (g) is not tight; for example, for n = 2 12 , our estimated for log( (f , g ) ) is around 57.75 while it is approximately 46 by experiments. Table 2 shows our implement results for the subfield attack against NTRU problem for n = 2 11 in which we choose the subfield L ≤ K with |K : L| = r and log(r) = 2 according to (6) . Note that for the case log(q) = 70, 71, the attack is successful, i.e. the obtained results are multiple of the secret key (f, g), but they are not short enough as required. Table 3 shows our implement results for the subfield attack against NTRU problem for n = 2 12 in which we choose the subfield L ≤ K with |K : L| = r and log(r) = 3 according to (6) . Experimental results for n = 2 9 and n = 2 10 are shown in the Appendix.
Conclusion
In this work, we exploit technical results from Kirchner and Fouque [12] to reanalyze the subfield attack by Albrecht et al. [1] against the overstretched NTRU problem. We derives better choices of the subfields for which the attack is successful with smaller modulus. Our experiments show that our succeeded modulus is much smaller than that of Albrecht et al. [1] . However, with our choices of subfields, we have to work with lattices of higher dimensions (as twice as those of Albrecht et al.) and hence the attack takes longer. Our implementation results for the case n = 2 11 (with same choice of subfield) are close to that of Kirchner and Fouque [12] (log(q) = 72 vs. log(q) = 70), while for the case n = 2 12 (with different choice of subfield), we can break the NTRU problem with smaller modulus (log(q) = 120 vs. log(q) = 144). Whereas Kirchner and Fouque's method can break NTRU problem with smaller modulus q in some cases (e.g, n = 2 11 ), it does not guarantee to succeed with bigger q, in contrast to the subfield attack which gives the exact limit of success. Recently, Cheon et al. [5] proposed an Table 2 . Implementation results for n = 2 11 and log(r) = 2. Here we work with lattices of dimension 2n = 1024. The third column rhf stands for root Hermite factor obtained from our experiments (cf. the constant c in Heuristic 6) log(q) log( (f , g ) ) rhf log( (x , y ) ) log ( (x, y) attack against overstretched NTRU problem which exploits the existence of the sublattice in the NTRU lattice similar to that of Kirchner and Fouque. Their attack can apply for NTRU problem with general modulus polynomial φ(x) and they also give an improved subfield attack. One of our future work is to give a complete comparison between those attacks against overstretched NTRU problem. Table 3 . Implementation results for n = 2 12 and log(r) = 3. Here we work with lattices of dimension 2n = 1024 log(q) log( (f , g ) ) rhf log( (x , y ) ) log( (x, y) ) Is (x, y) ≤ q 
